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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
AFTER LIBYA: HUMANITARIAN 
PREVENTION AS CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
So I’d be very happy, maybe not in five but ten years from now, 
if we simply could go out of business – that [The Responsibility 
to Protect] becomes so much a part of international and nation-
al behavior that there is no need anymore for the U.N. to keep 
pushing it. 
Edward Luck, Special Advisor to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, August 2011 
INTRODUCTION 
n February 2011, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi ordered his 
forces to massacre more than one thousand Libyans on ac-
count of their peaceful protests against his regime.1 This led to 
the U.N. Security Council’s passage of Resolution 19702 on 
February 26, 2011, which invoked the Libyan leadership’s re-
sponsibility to safeguard its people, criticized the violence 
against its citizens, and imposed sanctions as a first means of 
international pressure to stop the violence.3 On March 17, after 
                                                                                                             
 1. Hon. Gareth Evans, Chancellor, Australian National University and 
President Emeritus, International Crisis Group, Second Renate Kamener 
Oration: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes (Jul. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Evans, 
Kamener Oration], available at 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech443.html. Col. Qaddafi was killed on 
October 20, 2011. Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid & Rick Gladstone, Violent 
End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/libyan-fighters-say-qaddafi-
stronghold-has-fallen.html?hp. 
 2. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). The United Na-
tions is an international organization founded in 1945 to promote peace and 
security, economic, social, and human rights, and to aid in the development of 
friendly relations among nations. UN at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). The 
General Assembly, with 193 member states of the United Nations, sets the 
agenda and priorities for the organization. Main Bodies, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). The Security 
Council, with five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members, is 
charged under the U.N. Charter with maintaining international peace and 
security. Id. 
 3. See Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1. 
I
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it became clear that Col. Qaddafi was planning a major attack 
on Benghazi, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 
1973,4 allowing for coercive military action to take “‘all neces-
sary measures’ to enforce a no-fly zone, and ‘all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack.’”5 
In pursuing these objectives, Resolution 1973 implemented 
an international legal doctrine known as the Responsibility to 
Protect (“R2P”).6 R2P proposes that when a country fails to pro-
tect its citizens from one of four mass atrocities—genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity—it is 
the responsibility, and indeed the duty, of the international 
community to prevent the atrocity from going forward.7 The 
impetus for R2P came from a series of humanitarian catastro-
phes in the twentieth century.8 Some of these garnered Securi-
                                                                                                             
 4. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). Resolution 
1973 passed with five abstentions. See Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, 
The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to 
Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 844 (2011). China and Russia, two permanent 
members of the Security Council with veto powers, abstained, as did Brazil, 
India, and Germany. See United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 





 5. Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1 (citing S.C. Res. 1973, supra 
note 4). 
 6. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–139, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005); see also Interview by U.N. News Cen-
tre with Edward Luck, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General (Aug. 1, 
2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=38. 
 7. See U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for a Changed World at Berlin Event, U.N. Doc. 
SG/SM/11701 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter Remarks on Responsible Sover-
eignty]; see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Responsibility to Protect and Inter-
national Justice, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 91, 98 (2011) (“The goal [of the R2P] is 
to develop an international legal norm or policy, which achieves international 
protection, international accountability, and the prevention and deterrence of 
further occurrences of mass atrocities and serious crimes.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
2001), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-
genocide/4571/ (reporting that approximately 800,000 Tutsi Rwandans were 
murdered by the Hutu). 
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ty Council resolutions that authorized military intervention or 
other action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,9 including 
episodes in Somalia,10 Liberia,11 Rwanda,12 Haiti,13 Sierra Leo-
ne14 and Kosovo.15 Yet while the passage of these resolutions 
led some scholars to assume an emerging challenge to tradi-
tional notions of state sovereignty,16 the Security Council’s ef-
forts did not have a profound physical effect on halting the kill-
ing of innocent people.17 Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in particu-
                                                                                                             
 9. U.N. Charter, ch. VII. 
 10. See S.C. Res. 751, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 
814 ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993). 
 11. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992). 
 12. See S.C. Res. 929, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 2, 1994). 
 13. See S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). 
 14. See S.C. Res. 1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181 (July 13, 1998). 
 15. See S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 16. See Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document 
to Doctrine: But What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 289 
(Spring 2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Department of Public Information, Somalia: U.N.OSOM I, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm (last 
updated Mar. 21, 1997). 
By 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number 
in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition 
and related diseases. The magnitude of suffering was immense. 
Overall, an estimated 300,000 people, including many children, died. 
Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their home areas, 
fled either to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. 
All institutions of governance and at least 60 per cent of the coun-
try’s basic infrastructure disintegrated. 
Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1992–LIBERIA (Jan. 1 1992), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca40c.html  (“[T]he hu-
man rights situation in Liberia continues to be marked by abuses ranging 
from extrajudicial killing and torture to restrictions on freedom of movement 
and intolerance of dissent.”); Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm (“Between April 
and June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of 
100 days.”); Jane Doe et al. v. Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, THE CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/section.php?id=75 (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2012) (“An estimated 4,000 civilians were killed and several hundred 
thousand were tortured, imprisoned, or forced into exile by the Haitian 
Armed Forces and a paramilitary organization called FRAPH—a play on the 
French and Creole verb ‘frapper,’ meaning ‘to hit’ or ‘to beat.’”); Sierra Leone, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/sierra_leone.aspx?lang=eng&view=d 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
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lar, emphasized the failings of the U.N.’s traditional approach 
and fueled the development of R2P.18 By 2008, Secretary-
General Ban Ki–Moon stated that R2P “is a concept, not yet a 
policy; an aspiration, not yet a reality.”19 
Yet, after Resolution 1973’s passage in 2011, R2P is no longer 
just a concept; it is a reality for Libyans, the United States, and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”).20 It is not 
merely an aspiration of those members of the international 
community who support military intervention. While the re-
sponse to the Libyan crisis was not the first use of R2P,21 it was 
the first time the doctrine had been used to impose military 
force in order to protect civilians.22 As a result, world leaders, 
international and foreign policy experts, and humanitarian or-
ganizations have had a moment to reflect on the successes and 
failures of R2P.23 
                                                                                                             
On October 8, 1997, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the United Nations Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 1132 imposing sanctions against Sierra Leone in response to 
the violence and loss of life and deteriorating humanitarian condi-
tions in Sierra Leone following the military coup of May 25, 1997. 
Id.; Flashback to Kosovo’s war, BBC NEWS (July 10, 2006, 15:02 GMT 16:02 
UK), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165042.stm (“Meanwhile, a campaign 
of ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Albanians was initiated by Serbian forces. 
Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to Albania, Macedonia and Montene-
gro. The international tribunal in The Hague said its investigators had found 
at least 2,000 bodies.”). 
 18. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, Forward to INT’L COMM. ON 
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
REPORT OF THE INT’L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, at vii 
(2001) (“NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the controversy [of 
external military intervention for human protection purposes] to its most 
intense head.”). 
 19. Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty, supra note 7. 
 20. See, e.g., Fahim, Shadid & Gladstone, supra note 1. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra; Alex J. Bellamy, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The 
Exception and the Norm, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 1 (Fall 2011) [hereinafter 
Bellamy, The Exception and the Norm]; Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4, at 
825 (“[T]he situation in Libya marked the first time the council had author-
ized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a 
functioning state.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Luck, supra note 6. For example, the government of Brazil 
proposed a parallel concept to R2P called “Responsibility While Protecting.” 
Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
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This Note will argue that preventing humanitarian atrocities 
(hereinafter “humanitarian prevention”) stands alone as cus-
tomary international law (“CIL”), meaning that nations already 
operate under an obligation to prevent mass atrocities inde-
pendent of the R2P doctrine.24 The question whether humani-
tarian intervention, or unauthorized military intervention 
(hereinafter “military intervention”) is CIL is not a new one, 
and this Note does not attempt to look again at whether R2P 
advances the legality of unilateral military intervention.25 Ra-
ther, this Note supports a statement made by Gareth Evans, 
co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty Report, arguing against the narrow view 
that “R2P is just another name for military intervention,”26 by 
recognizing that prevention and rebuilding—two fundamental 
elements of R2P, as will be discussed in detail below—expand 
                                                                                                             
Keynote Address at the Stanley Foundation Workshop: Responsibility While 
Protecting: What’s Next? (Aug. 23, 2012). The focus of Responsibility While 
Protecting is to enhance guidelines under which the Security Council con-
templates military intervention and monitors any authorized intervention. 
See id. 
 24. For more information on the legal duties imposed by R2P, see general-
ly Päivi Asikainen, The Responsibility to Protect of the International Commu-
nity: A Study on the Protection Duties of the United Nations and Its Member 
States (Autumn 2011) (unpublished LLM thesis, Uppsala University School 
of Law), available at http://www.uppsalajuristernasalumnistiftelse.se/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/2011_paivi.pdf. 
 25. Unlike some scholars who have discussed whether unilateral military 
action, or military intervention, is customary international law, this Note 
focuses only on the preventive aspect of R2P. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
Legitimating Military Intervention: Principles and Procedures, 2 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 550 (2001); see generally Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for 
Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance 
the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE 
RED CROSS 803, 830 (Dec. 2009) (opining on the effect of R2P on the legality of 
unilateral military intervention and concluding that it “does not provide a 
real reassessment of military intervention such as to change the prospects of 
the world’s most vulnerable”); Michael L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A 
Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Military Intervention, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 417 (1996) (arguing that unilateral military intervention, versus collec-
tive military intervention through the Security Council, should be codified in 
international law). For a good discussion of the classic arguments in support 
of and against military intervention as customary international law, see Ian 
Hurd, Is Military Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent 
World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 293 (2011); see also Burton, supra note 25. 
 26. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS 
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 56 (2008). 
310 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
the doctrine beyond such a narrow scope.27 In other words, 
there is sufficient evidence that humanitarian prevention—
independent of its role as a component of R2P—enjoys CIL sta-
tus,28 regardless of the legal status of military intervention.29 
                                                                                                             
 27. See INT’L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INT’L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY ch. 3, 5 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]. The ICISS 
Report acknowledges that at the time of its publication, there was not a “suf-
ficiently strong basis to claim that [military intervention for human protec-
tion purposes is] a new principle of customary international law.” Id. ¶ 2.24. 
 28. Discussed infra in Part III. 
 29. There are two lines of argument that question the legality of military 
intervention. First, the case that military intervention is illegal rests most 
obviously in the language of the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4), which plainly 
prohibits the use of force by states. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Even where 
the scope of the U.N. provision could be narrowed to outlaw force only 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of states, in prac-
tice, this argument has failed. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (Britain arguing, and the ICJ rejecting, the argument 
that its unwelcomed sweep for mines in Albanian waters did not meet the 
level of intervention prohibited by Article 2(4)). Thus, any customary interna-
tional law would have to overcome the strong presumption that military in-
tervention is illegal. Second, in 2006, years before R2P’s use in Libya, some 
scholars viewed R2P as a comprehensive approach to military intervention. 
See Hamilton, supra note 16, at 293; see also Bellamy, The Exception and the 
Norm, supra note 22, at 1 (“Where it was once a term of art employed by a 
handful of like-minded countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with 
suspicion by much of the rest of the world, [R2P] has become a commonly 
accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atroci-
ties.”); Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 1, 1 (Fall 2011) (“With the exception of Raphael Lemkin’s efforts on be-
half of the 1948 Genocide Convention, no idea has moved faster in the inter-
national normative arena than [the R2P.]”); but see Helene Cooper & Scott L. 
Malcolmson, Welcome to My World, Barack, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2008, (Mag-
azine), at 44, 49 (quoting former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “[W]e 
thought the Responsibility to Protect meant something . . . . [but] in the Dar-
fur case it has turned out to be nothing but words. I think it has been an 
enormous embarrassment for the Security Council and for multilateral di-
plomacy.”). However, a universally recognized approach to humanitarian cri-
ses does not necessarily mean that military intervention itself is recognized 
CIL. See Vesel, supra note 96, at 14 (“The difficult question to answer is 
whether the U.N. Security Council’s power to evaluate threats to interna-
tional peace and security is a power granted primarily to the Security Council 
or exclusively to it.”). For example, those legal scholars who support military 
intervention often call for it to be codified in the U.N. Charter or a General 
Assembly Resolution. Id.; see generally Burton, supra note 25. 
2012] RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AFTER LIBYA 311 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of R2P leading 
up to its formal recognition by the U.N. General Assembly in 
2005.30 Part II reviews one modern approach to defining cus-
tomary international law, under which humanitarian preven-
tion may best be analyzed. Finally, Part III identifies humani-
tarian prevention as customary international law and address-
es R2P and Libya, considering how the crisis in Libya may 
have resulted in an exceptional application of R2P. 
I. BACKGROUND OF R2P 
A. The Impetus for R2P 
The international conflicts of the early twentieth century, in-
cluding both World Wars, encouraged the development of the 
U.N. Charter. That Charter was deliberately crafted to place a 
strong emphasis on state sovereignty.31 But by the end of the 
century, numerous instances of humanitarian crises—often the 
very kind proscribed by the U.N. Charter32—forced the interna-
tional community to consider how to respond to mass atrocity 
when traditional notions of state sovereignty counseled against 
any kind of interference.33 Though by no means the only exam-
ple of humanitarian crisis in the late twentieth century,34 this 
                                                                                                             
 30. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 6, ¶¶ 138–139. 
 31. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 32. See, e.g., the Genocide Convention, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 
(Dec. 8, 1948). 
 33. ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, at para. 1.35 (“The defen[s]e of state sov-
ereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not include any claim of the 
unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people.”). Brookings 
Institution scholar Francis Deng, who was later appointed the U.N.’s Special 
Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, co-authored Sovereignty as Responsi-
bility. See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY (1996). 
 34. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the international community 
struggled once again as it considered how to respond to the humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo in 1998–1999. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, 
Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1211 
(Sept. 2011). There, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) reportedly 
performed major crimes against humanity—such as rape, mutilation, and 
murder— on the Kosovo-Albanian population. See Horrors of Kosovo Re-
vealed, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/551875.stm. At the beginning of the crisis, 
approximately 500,000 Albanians in Kosovo fled their homes to seek safety. 
See Rapid Needs Assessment Among Kosovar Refugees Hosted by Albanian 
Families and Assessment of Human Rights Violations Committed in Kosovo, 
312 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
section will review the Rwandan genocide in some detail in or-
der to demonstrate the strong motivation for adopting R2P. 
In March of 1998, President Clinton issued what would later 
be termed the “Clinton apology”35 on the tarmac of the Rwan-
dan airport.36 His apology came four years after Hutu militia-
men murdered some 800,000 Tutsi Rwandans.37 Samantha 
Power, the Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs in the Na-
tional Security Council in the Obama Administration,38 has 
                                                                                                             
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (1999), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1464&cat=
special-report. The Security Council reacted with a series of resolutions be-
tween 1998 and 1999, though none of these resolutions authorized military 
intervention. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); 
S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 18, 1999); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (May 
14, 1999); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). Regardless, 
in 1999 collective North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) forces inter-
vened in the autonomous Yugoslav region to quell the violence. See Shaffer & 
Pollack, supra note 34, at 1210–11. Yugoslavia responded with a legal chal-
lenge at the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), claiming that NATO had 
violated Yugoslavia’s recognized sovereignty under the U.N. Charter. See id. 
at 1211; see also Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 279, ¶ 22 (Dec. 15). The ICJ never formally resolved 
the issue, but instead dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 129. 
 35. Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 2. 
 36. See id. The author quotes President Clinton’s speech: 
It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost 
members of your family, but all over the world there were people like 
me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appre-
ciate [pause] the depth [pause] and the speed [pause] with which you 
were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror. 
Id. Clinton also said: 
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must 
bear its share of the responsibility for this tragedy . . . We did not act 
quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed 
the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not 
immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. 
John Ryle, A Sorry Apology from Clinton, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 1998), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,234216,00.html (criti-
cizing Clinton’s apology as being disingenuous because the lack of interven-
tion was in fact U.S. policy, not an administrative oversight). 
 37. See Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 1. 
 38. Power is also a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for her book, A Problem 
from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. See generally, SAMANTHA POWER, 
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suggested that the cause of the United States’ delayed recogni-
tion of the Rwandan atrocity stemmed from the existence of 
two competing narratives.39 To those on the ground, she ex-
plains, Hutu actions clearly constituted genocide; whereas, in 
the minds of U.S. policymakers, Rwanda was engaged in a civil 
war.40 In Washington, the images of brutal killing in Rwanda 
immediately brought back memories of the failed peacekeeping 
efforts in Somalia in 1993.41 As a result, one United States offi-
cial recalled, “[a]nytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa . 
. . the crucifixes and garlic would come up on every door.”42 
Although the United States eventually voted in the Security 
Council to send peacekeeping troops to Rwanda,43 it conveyed 
in no uncertain terms that it would not be sending U.S. 
troops.44 By May of 1994, six weeks after the most serious 
fighting began, then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher finally acknowledged that the extermination of Tutsi was 
a genocide.45 Whatever responses under the Genocide Conven-
tion this admission implicated, hundreds of thousands of Tutsi 
were already dead.46 
In 2000, after the majority of violence had abated in both the 
Rwanda and Kosovo conflicts, then-U.N. Secretary-General Ko-
fi Annan asked the international community, “if military inter-
vention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept 
of our common humanity?”47 With the blessing of the U.N., the 
                                                                                                             
A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (Harper Perennial 
2007) (2002). 
 39. See Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 8. 
 40. See id. (emphasis added). 
 41. See id. During peacekeeping efforts in Somalia in 1993, which lasted 
for over ten months, a firefight broke out in which images of wounded U.S. 
soldiers, and one dead U.S. Ranger, were broadcast on Somali television. At 
least eighteen American soldiers died and seventy-three were wounded 
throughout the conflict. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 15. 
 46. See id. at 14. By May 18, humanitarian agencies put the death toll at 
between 200,000 and 500,000, mostly Tutsi, civilians. See id. On either side of 
the estimation, these numbers easily met the stipulations of the Genocide 
Convention. See id. 
 47. ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, at vii (2001). 
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government of Canada and world organizations endeavored to 
answer this question.48 
B. The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty 
Following Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s challenge, Canada 
established the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (“ICISS”).49 The goal of the ICISS was to ar-
ticulate a fresh perspective on the issues that encompass the 
sovereignty-intervention debate.50 The ICISS presented its Re-
port (“Report”) in December 2001,51 and in doing so, succeeded 
in shifting the discussion from one of sovereignty versus mili-
tary intervention to one that focused on a state’s inherent re-
sponsibility to protect its citizens.52 The Report ushered in a 
major linguistic and conceptual change by assuming that sov-
ereignty includes a responsibility for states to protect their na-
tional citizenry from crimes against humanity.53 Furthermore, 
the Report went so far as to say that when states fail to protect 
their own populations, it is permissible, indeed incumbent up-
on, other states to prevent violence against innocent civilians.54 
                                                                                                             
 48. See generally id. Despite its role in the ICISS Report, in early fall of 
2012, Canada reneged its support for the R2P. See Kyle Matthews, Canada’s 
Abandonment of the Responsibility to Protect, CENTRE FOR INT’L POLICY 
STUDIES (Sept. 20, 2012), http://cips.uottawa.ca/canadas-abandonment-of-the-
responsibility-to-protect/. 
 49. See generally id. The ICISS was composed of the Government of Cana-
da together with a group of major foundations. See id., at vii. 
 50. See id., ¶ 1.41. 
 51. See Charles Homans, Responsibility to Protect: A Short History, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/responsibility_to_protect_a_
short_history. 
 52. See Matthew H. Charity, The Criminalized State: The International 
Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and Darfur, Republic of Sudan, 
37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 90 (2011) (citing ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶¶ 
2.14–2.15); Neville F. Dastoor, The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a 
Security Council Committee on the Responsibility to Protect, 22 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 25, 28 (Winter 2009). 
 53. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 1.41; see also Massingham, supra 
note 25, at 816 (“[T]here seems to be consensus that speaking in terms of a 
responsibility to protect rather than right to intervene provides a very signifi-
cant departure from the 1990s articulations of military intervention. Indeed, 
this language shift is seen by many as being very powerful.”). 
 54. See Dastoor, supra note 52, at 28. 
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While the crux of the Report addresses the question of which 
circumstances make it appropriate for states to take coercive 
military action against another state in order to protect people 
at risk,55 it also lays the foundation for the creation of the cus-
tomary international law of preventing humanitarian crises.56 
The Report presented this analysis in three parts: the “respon-
sibility to prevent,”57 the “responsibility to react,”58 and, when 
the proper reaction calls for military intervention, the “respon-
sibility to rebuild.”59 
1. The Responsibility to Prevent 
The Report identifies three essential conditions that states 
must meet in order to effectively prevent the large-scale human 
suffering and loss about which the ICISS is concerned.60 These 
conditions are: (1) “early warning,”61 or knowledge of an immi-
nent conflict situation and the dangers that accompany it; (2) 
the so-called “preventive toolbox,”62 wherein policy measures 
are available to make a positive difference with respect to that 
conflict; and (3) the “political will”63 to implement the policies 
that will prevent the pending humanitarian crisis. The goal of 
the ICISS was not to reinvent the wheel on conflict prevention, 
yet the Report goes into some detail about the three conditions 
above and continuously mentions the importance of prevention 
as a precursor to military intervention.64 
                                                                                                             
 55. See generally, ICISS REPORT, supra note 27. 
 56. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 4.1 
When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation 
and when a State is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, 
then intervention measures by other members of the broader com-
munity of States may be required. These coercive measures may in-
clude political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cas-
es—but only in extreme cases—they may also include military ac-
tion. 
Id. 
 57. Id. ch. 3. 
 58. ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ch. 4. 
 59. Id. ch. 5. 
 60. See id. ¶ 3.9. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g. id., ¶¶ 3.9, 4.1, 4.13, 4.38; see also Charity, supra note 52, at 
93. 
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2. The Responsibility to React 
The ICISS clarifies that the responsibility to react must first 
and foremost limit state actions to those of equal proportion to 
the seriousness of the crisis.65 Possible reactions include politi-
cal, economic, or judicial measures, and, in the most extreme 
cases, they may also include military intervention.66 The Re-
port identifies six criteria that together form the predicate to 
any military intervention: “right authority, just cause, right 
intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable pro-
spects.”67 The ICISS does not attempt to supersede domestic, 
sovereign control of the state—the sanctity of which is reflected 
                                                                                                             
 65. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 4.39 (“The scale, duration and in-
tensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum neces-
sary to secure the humanitarian objective in question.”). 
 66. See id. ¶ 4.1. The Commission also notes that measures short of mili-
tary intervention should be implemented with as much care. See id. ¶ 4.5. 
Economic sanctions, in particular, have been criticized for having much 
harsher outcomes on civilian populations than the leaders against whom the 
sanctions were originally imposed. See id. ¶ 4.5. 
 67. Id. ¶ 4.16 (original emphasis omitted). There have been numerous dis-
cussions, and literature is extensive, on what conditions are required to trig-
ger military intervention in reaction to a humanitarian crisis. See, e.g., id. ¶ 
4.15 (“It is true that there are presently almost as many different lists of [cri-
teria for military intervention] as there are contributions to the literature 
and political debate on this subject.”). However, there is substantial indica-
tion that the Security Council is unlikely to endorse either the ICISS’s rec-
ommendations for conditions that elicit military intervention or any other 
inflexible triggers. See, e.g. Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1; see also 
Wheeler, supra note 25, at 552, 559, 564 (discussing the positions of China, 
Russia and the United States in response to a British proposal that permits 
military intervention without Security Council authorization in the event of a 
humanitarian crisis. Each of those three permanent members of the Security 
Council rejected the proposal.); Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, Per-
manent Representative of the United States of America, to the United Na-
tions (Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author). U.S. Ambassador John Bolton 
acknowledged: 
[T]he international community has a responsibility to act when the 
host state allows such atrocities. But the responsibility of the other 
countries in the international community is not of the same charac-
ter as the responsibility of the host . . . We do not accept that either 
the United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual 
states, have an obligation to intervene under international law. 
Id. 
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in Articles 2(4)68 and 2(7)69 of the U.N. Charter—and therefore 
recommends that the Security Council approve all military ac-
tion under Chapter VII.70 This was the method used to author-
ize intervention in Libya, pursuant to Resolutions 1970 and 
1973.71 The Report then acknowledges that intervention may 
not be available in every circumstance, but rejected this line of 
reasoning as an excuse to avoid any intervention efforts.72 This 
insight is particularly relevant given the current debate, as of 
this writing, over why military intervention was invoked in 
Libya but has not been used in the same capacity in Syria.73 
3. The Responsibility to Rebuild 
Finally, the Report mandates an obligation to rebuild post-
intervention.74 Whenever an intervening body considers mili-
tary intervention, the Report suggests, it should also formulate 
a post-intervention strategy to prevent the resurgence of what-
ever factors originally instigated the crisis.75 The Report goes 
on to address some of the main impediments to effective post-
intervention strategy, such as security, justice and reconcilia-
                                                                                                             
 68. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 69. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to sub-
mit such matters to [settlement] under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
Id. 
 70. U.N. Charter, ch. VII. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 6.13; see also 
Defeis, supra note 7, at 93 (noting that initial resistance to the R2P lay in 
concerns that addressing human rights as member states would violate Arti-
cle 2(7) of the U.N. Charter). 
 71. See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2; see also S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4. 
 72. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 4.43; see also James Pattison, The 
Ethics of Military intervention in Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 7 (2011) 
(“[W]hen compared to no action in Libya or anywhere else . . . saving some 
lives is better than saving none.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 73. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 74. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27 at ch. 5. 
 75. See id. ¶ 5. 
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tion, and economic development.76 Providing recommendations 
for addressing these concerns, the Report emphasizes that, 
though valid, such difficulties must be viewed as obstacles to 
overcome rather than excuses for abstaining from needed in-
tervention.77 
C. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and 
the “Three-Pillar” Approach 
In 2005, the U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report (“High-Level 
Panel Report”) entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility.78 By citing Chapter VII and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Geno-
cide Convention”),79 the High-Level Panel Report counters the 
conception that non-intervention is an appropriate response to 
humanitarian atrocities.80 It adopts the ICISS’s view that when 
member states sign the U.N. Charter, they not only benefit 
from establishing themselves as sovereign nations but also ac-
cept the responsibility to protect human lives from atrocities.81 
The High-Level Panel Report also acknowledges that history 
provides numerous examples of sovereign states having been 
either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, and in doing 
so the report places some of the responsibilities to protect on 
the international community.82 
                                                                                                             
 76. ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, at ch. 5. 
 77. Id. ¶ 5.6–5.7. 
 78. See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter High-Level 
Panel Report]. The report states: 
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective internation-
al responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council au-
thorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of geno-
cide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law which sovereign Govern-
ments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. 
Id. 
 79. See G.A. Res. 260, supra note 32. 
 80. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 78, ¶ 200. 
 81. See id. ¶ 29. 
 82. See id. Any collective action on behalf of the international community 
should be done in strict accordance with the U.N. Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Id. 
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Once the High-Level Panel Report was released in 2004, the 
General Assembly codified its support for R2P in the Outcome 
Document from the 2005 World Summit.83 Though nonbinding, 
the Generally Assembly’s resolution required significant nego-
tiation and represented a substantial step forward in affirming 
international commitment to R2P.84 Shortly thereafter, in April 
2006, the Security Council expressly adopted the language of 
R2P in Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict. 85 
Secretary-General Ban Ki–Moon has shown particular inter-
est in and support for R2P.86 He has given a number of speech-
es on the topic since the beginning of his term as Secretary-
General,87 perhaps most notably in 2008 when he laid out the 
succinct “three pillars” approach, encapsulating the ICISS’s 
original framework for R2P.88 The first pillar states that indi-
vidual nations unanimously affirm their responsibility to pro-
tect their populations from four crimes, whether acted or incit-
ed: genocide,89 war crimes,90 ethnic cleansing91 and crimes 
                                                                                                             
 83. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 6, ¶¶ 138–139. 
 84. However, because of the negotiations, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
Outcome Document support the concept in general but exclude some of the 
measures that would guide its implementation. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra 
note 34, at 1232. 
 85. See S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
 86. See, e.g., Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty, supra note 7 (focusing 
on the function of regional and sub-regional arrangements in accordance with 
the R2P). 
 87. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter Implementing]. 
 88. See generally, id.; see also Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty, supra 
note 7. 
 89. See G.A. Res. 260, supra note 32 (“In the present Convention, genocide 
means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .”). For example, 
genocide occurred when Hutu murdered 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda. See Power, 
Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 15. 
 90. War crimes are “grave breaches” to the 1949 Geneva Convention, such 
as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by mili-
tary necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Geneva Convention, 
art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. 
 91. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, ¶ 130 
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against humanity.92 The second pillar states that the interna-
tional community endorses this goal by demanding preventive 
steps that neither require Security Council unanimity nor come 
after images of devastation and death that “shock the con-
science of the world.”93 The third pillar insists that U.N. mem-
ber states respond to the four listed crimes quickly and deci-
sively, and in accordance with the U.N. Charter.94 Such a re-
sponse may draw upon a range of U.N. resources and should 
preempt the atrocity from unfolding while emphasizing flexibil-
ity and durability.95 
It is with this in mind that this Note turns to a brief discus-
sion of Customary International Law and ultimately considers 
whether the second pillar—centering on humanitarian preven-
tion—is an international norm. 
II. CONTEMPORARY CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CIL has frequently been discussed in the context of R2P and 
military intervention.96 For the purposes of this Note, military 
intervention refers to unilateral military action without the Se-
curity Council’s authentication under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter.97 Military action invoked under the R2P framework is 
legally authorized by the Security Council, and therefore is 
contemplated separately from military intervention.98 Such 
U.N. authorizations abide by the U.N. Charter by seeking to 
“maintain or restore international peace and security” to the 
                                                                                                             
(May 27, 1994) (“[T]he Commission confirms its earlier view that ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to 
remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of an-
other ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”). 
 92. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, Art. 7, 1999–2002); See generally Remarks on Responsible 
Sovereignty, supra note 7. 
 93. Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty, supra note 7. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 25; Hamilton, supra note 16, at 292; Da-
vid Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Military Intervention in an Imperfect 
World, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 13–19 (2003); Massingham, supra note 25. 
 97. See U.N. Charter art. 42; Vesel, supra note 96, at 13 (“The issue here is 
unilateral intervention, which for the purposes of this article is defined as 
any intervention outside of a specific U.N. Security Council resolution, as 
authorized under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.”). 
 98. See U.N. Charter ch. VII; see also ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 6.13. 
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world.99 Section A will discuss the traditional view of CIL. Sec-
tion B will introduce one contemporary view of CIL in which 
state action is deemphasized.100 This contemporary approach 
will then be applied in Part III to show that humanitarian pre-
vention is CIL. 
A. Traditional View of Customary International Law 
For most of the twentieth century, treaties, such as the U.N. 
Charter or other multilateral agreements between two or more 
nations, have governed international laws.101 Before the start 
of the first World War, however, CIL was the principle form of 
international law, in both the sphere of public international 
law—laws governing nations—and that of private international 
law—laws governing private disputes between international 
parties.102 
CIL has historically been composed of two sources: state 
practice and opinio juris.103 “State practice,” objectively meas-
ured, refers to those actions that have become internationally 
legitimized through “general and consistent” usage.104 Opinio 
juris is “a subjective feeling of legal obligation regarding the 
practice in question.”105 For example, it is fair to assume that 
opinio juris cautions state leaders against committing genocide. 
                                                                                                             
 99. U.N. Charter art. 42; see also Vesel, supra note 96, at 13–14 (discuss-
ing how customary international law may justify intervention where the 
U.N., through Art. 42, has not). 
 100. See infra; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary Inter-
national Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 1, 3 (Fall 2010) [hereinafter Bradley & Gulati, Withdrawal Rights]. 
(“Far from being well understood and accepted, the theory of CIL today is 
riddled with uncertainty.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Cus-
tom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (Nov. 2010) [hereinafter Bradley & Gulati, With-
drawing]. 
 103. See Vesel, supra note 96, at 13. A small subset of norms are considered 
“preemptory norms,” or “jus cogens norms,” which are so absolute in their 
character that they do not permit any exceptions. Bradley & Gulati, With-
drawing, supra note 102, at 212. Examples of jus cogens norms that cannot 
be overridden, even by treaty or prior persistent objection, are genocide, slav-
ery, and torture. Id. at 212–13. 
 104. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 
102(2) cmt. b (1987). 
 105. Michael Byers, Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81, 83 (2001). 
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Because opinio juris is “generally contained within a particular 
dense [state] practice,” it does not usually require its own 
showing unless there is a specific ambiguity concerning when 
the norm is invoked.106 Using the same example, because states 
generally do not engage in genocide, a separate showing of sub-
jective opinio juris is not necessary to demonstrate that geno-
cide is illegal under CIL. 
Traditionally, as long as state practice and opinio juris attach 
to a specific action, that action is considered legitimate under 
international law and may be binding without an international 
agreement, treaty, or international court decision.107 As a re-
sult, CIL can bind states universally and may be based signifi-
cantly less on explicit consent than treaties or other interna-
tional agreements,108 which are only binding on party states.109 
Moreover, as they are based on implicit understandings and 
custom, there is typically no opportunity for a state to unilater-
ally “withdraw” from observation of a CIL, as it might do with 
a statute.110 
B. One Contemporary View of Customary International Law 
There is significant debate about what sources are acceptable 
for fulfilling the requirements of CIL.111 For example, some 
                                                                                                             
 106. Peter Stockburger, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary 
International Law, An Emerging Legal Norm, or Just Wishful Thinking?, 5 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365, 391 (2010). 
 107. Various scholars treat this standard definition differently; some seek 
to deemphasize the subjective element (opinio juris) and others have at-
tempted to deemphasize the objective element (state action). See Bradley & 
Gulati, Withdrawing, supra note 102, at 210. 
 108. Id. at 214. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. In a subsequent article, Professors Bradley and Gulati expound, 
It is not clear, for example, what counts as state practice. Should a 
nation’s treaty practice count? Can evidence of opinio juris, such as 
positions taken in international institutions, also constitute state 
practice? How much state practice must there be, and for how long? 
Similar questions abound for opinio juris. For example, to what ex-
tent do the views expressed by a state with respect to international 
resolutions or treaty norms count as evidence of opinio juris for CIL? 
To what extent can opinio juris be inferred from practice? More fun-
damentally, if CIL requires that nations believe that they are legally 
obligated, how does that belief arise in the first place? 
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scholars cite treaties as evidence of state practice in order to 
justify a new principle of CIL,112 a practice that other scholars 
question.113 And though the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) has accepted some international resolutions, such as 
those promulgated by the U.N. General Assembly, as evidence 
of a new CIL,114 critics have questioned how nonbinding 
agreements can satisfy the requirements of state practice and 
opinio juris.115 This is particularly relevant to establishing hu-
manitarian prevention as CIL in light of the General Assem-
bly’s endorsement of the R2P at the 2005 World Summit.116 
With the conception of establishing CIL in flux, Professors 
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith identified a contem-
porary way to analyze the creation of CIL, which challenges the 
traditional approach in three ways.117 First, it relies less fre-
quently on state practice than previous conceptions of CIL.118 
Second, it posits that CIL has the potential to develop quick-
ly.119 And third, it considers the ways in which CIL can regu-
late the relationship between the state and its citizens, rather 
than the relationship between two nations.120 Under this ap-
proach, an abundance of human rights violations are now wide-
ly accepted as CIL that would not be otherwise.121 
                                                                                                             
Bradley & Gulati, Withdrawal Rights, supra note 100, at 4. 
 112. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC. A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (2005) (“Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, but 
also bilateral ones, are often used as evidence of customary international law, 
but in an inconsistent way.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, International Agreements and the De-
velopment of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 972 (1986) 
(discussing the ambiguities raised by the question of “which circumstances of 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements contribute to new 
rules of customary law”). 
 114. See Bradley & Gulati, Withdrawing, supra note 102, at 213. 
 115. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 254–55 (July 8) (“[General Assembly resolutions] can, in certain 
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a 
rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”). 
 116. See generally G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 6, ¶¶ 138–139. 
 117. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815, 839 (Feb. 2007). 
 118. Id. at 842. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. Bradley and Goldsmith go on to state: 
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1. Deemphasizing State Practice 
The contemporary understanding of CIL is less tied to state 
practice than the traditional model, evidenced in large part by 
the acceptance of “General Assembly resolutions, multilateral 
treaties, and other international pronouncements” as sufficient 
evidence of state practice.122 Put another way, nations’ verbal 
or written commitments regarding a specific action are them-
selves considered state action. Human rights norms are more 
likely to be governed by CIL under this trend because a country 
may find itself party to a General Assembly resolution commit-
ted to preventing humanitarian crises when that country may 
not have independently committed to do so otherwise.123 
For example, in an ICJ case about U.S. military intervention 
in Nicaragua, the court relied significantly upon General As-
sembly resolutions and multilateral treaties to prove the exist-
ence of CIL principles regarding the acceptable use of force and 
non-intervention.124 In regards to state practice, the ICJ said 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established 
as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolute-
ly rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the 
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient 
that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent 
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct incon-
sistent with a given rule should generally have been treated 
                                                                                                             
There is widespread agreement that CIL now protects the rights to 
be free from genocide, slavery, summary execution or murder, “dis-
appearance,” “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,” “prolonged 
arbitrary detention,” and “systematic racial discrimination.” An in-
tergovernmental human rights committee recently asserted that CIL 
also protects “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” a pre-
sumption of innocence, a right of pregnant women and children not 
to be executed, and a right to be free from expressions of “national, 
racial, or religious hatred.” 
Id. at 841–842 (citing Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 702 (1987); United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Art. 40, 
¶ 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General 
Comment No. 24(52) at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994)). 
 122. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 117, at 839. 
 123. See infra. 
 124. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98–109 (June 27). 
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as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule.125 
The ICJ assumes the existence of a rule before demonstrating 
state practice in support of the CIL and then concludes state 
actions to the contrary are evidence of a breach of the rule.126 
The need for independent, concrete examples of state practice 
in order to establish a CIL is thus diminished. Responding to 
this statement, one scholar—endorsing the traditional concep-
tion of CIL—lamented that “[t]he Court thus completely mis-
understands customary law.”127 
The United States has demonstrated the same decreased em-
phasis on state practice embraced by the ICJ. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. 
Peña–Irala,128 consistently referred to treaties, the U.N. Char-
ter, and General Assembly resolutions to satisfy the state prac-
tice requirement and thus establish a CIL principle against the 
use of torture.129 It even acknowledged the frequency with 
which states do not comport to this rule, but then rejected the 
conclusion that this fact prevented them from finding evidence 
of a CIL.130 While some have criticized the decreased im-
portance of state practice in identifying CIL,131 the develop-
ment has no doubt been instrumental to determining that 
many human rights violations are CIL.132 Indeed, it is also in-
strumental in finding that humanitarian prevention is a CIL, 
as there is evidence that some states have failed to prevent 
humanitarian atrocities. 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at 98. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 101, 102 (1987). 
 128. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the Alien 
Tort Statute to hold aliens liable for tortious conduct, committed abroad, that 
violates the law of nations or a treaty of the United States). 
 129. See id. at 882–885. 
 130. Id. at 884 (“The fact that the prohibition of torture is often honored in 
the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of international 
law.”). 
 131. For example, in response to the ICJ’s opinion in the Nicaragua case, 
Professor D’Amato stated, “[i]t reveals the August judges of the International 
Court of Justice as collectively naive about the nature of custom as the pri-
mary source of international law.” D’Amato, supra note 127, at 105. 
 132. See id. 
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2. Quick Development 
A second difference between the traditional concept of CIL 
and this more modern approach is the opportunity under the 
latter for CIL to develop rapidly.133 For example, the ICJ stated 
that “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessari-
ly, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law.”134 One reason for this reduced temporal 
emphasis, proponents suggest, is that developments in com-
munication technology allow a state’s actions to be publicized 
quickly.135 Another reason is that the proliferation of interna-
tional organizations and institutions “accelerate[s] the process 
of customary law formation by relying upon the unique form of 
state practice which occurs in multilateral organizations like 
the United Nations.”136 Thus, the fact that R2P was not codified 
until the early twenty-first century should not count against 
the argument for humanitarian prevention as CIL. 
3. Relationship between Nations and Their Citizens 
Finally, the nature of the relationships traditionally covered 
by international law has changed.137 Rather than only govern-
ing relations among nations, CIL is now implicated in the rela-
tionship between the ruling party of a nation and its citizens.138 
But with the rise of human rights norms that are recognized as 
CIL, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, many of which fo-
cus on the treatment of citizens by their state, there has been a 
natural move toward viewing CIL as laws that govern the rela-
tionship between a nation and its citizens.139 This is clearly im-
plicated by R2P when a leader fails to uphold his responsibility 
to protect the state’s civilians. 
                                                                                                             
 133. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 117, at 840. 
 134. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 
I.C.J. 4, at 43 (Feb. 20). 
 135. Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Nations, § 102, reporter’s 
n.2 (1987). 
 136. Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over In-
ternational Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga 
v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 72 (1981). 
 137. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 117, at 840. 
 138. Id at 841. 
 139. Id. 
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III. HUMANITARIAN PREVENTION: AN EMERGING PRINCIPLE OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The military intervention in Libya has given the internation-
al community a moment to reflect on the successes and failures 
of the R2P framework. In a 2010 article examining the role of 
R2P five years after the 2005 World Summit, Alex Bellamy, a 
professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at University of 
Queensland, argued that the first pillar of R2P (as articulated 
by Secretary-General Ban Ki–Moon) simply restates human 
rights law.140 The prohibition of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity is already well estab-
lished in CIL.141 But pillars two and three, he continues, are 
not CIL themselves.142 He makes this determination partly by 
recognizing the inconsistent and shallow evidence of state prac-
tice.143 Yet considering the modern conception of CIL discussed 
in Part II, wherein state practice is less important to establish-
ing human rights principles of CIL, Bellamy’s hesitancy to rec-
ognize pillar two—preventive measures—as an international 
norm may be overly cautious, considering contemporary efforts 
to prevent mass atrocities. Section A will demonstrate how 
humanitarian prevention is CIL when evaluated under Bradley 
and Goldsmith’s framework. Section B will identify the anoma-
ly of Libya, in light of the military intervention there in 2011. 
Finally, Section C will briefly note the crisis in Syria, currently 
unfolding in 2012, and how the relevant actors there are still 
adhering to humanitarian prevention despite ongoing violence. 
                                                                                                             
 140. Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143, 160 (2010) [hereinafter Bellamy, Five Years On]. 
 141. Id. (“[The] R2P’s first pillar is therefore best understood as a reaffir-
mation and codification of already existing norms.”). 
 142. See id. at 160–62. The extent to which pillars two and three can be 
considered norms is whether there is a shared expectation that “1) govern-
ments and international organizations will exercise this responsibility, that 
2) they recognize a duty and right to do so, and that 3) failure to act will at-
tract criticism from the society of states.” Id. at 161. Further, even if pillars 
two and three are norms, they are weakened by indeterminacy, or the R2P’s 
flexibility regarding when and how best to respond to humanitarian crises. 
See id. at 161–62. 
 143. Id. at 161. 
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A. Humanitarian Prevention 
The international community’s responsibility for humanitari-
an prevention is itself CIL. Not only does this mean that there 
exists a legal obligation for states to prevent humanitarian cri-
ses, but also—if preventive measures are applied effective-
ly144—that there is less need for the Security Council to invoke 
military intervention under the reaction prong of R2P before 
intervening countries may take legally justified action. There-
fore, even while military intervention in the form of unilateral 
military intervention has not yet been established in CIL,145 
humanitarian prevention certainly has146 when considered un-
der the three prongs of Bradley and Goldsmith’s framework: 
de-emphasis on state practice, rapid development, and CIL as 
                                                                                                             
 144. Importantly, past attempts at prevention techniques have not always 
been successful. For example, peacekeeping preventive efforts in Rwanda 
were too little, too late. See Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 5. 
The U.N., commanded by Romeo Dallaire and other human rights organiza-
tions, were tasked with demilitarizing the Hutu so that the Tutsi could re-
turn without fear of being killed. See id. at 4. Dallaire was told that the 5,000 
soldiers he thought would be necessary to keep peace would never be fulfilled, 
so he trimmed his request to 2,500. See id. This allotment was not nearly 
sufficient to control the Hutu extremists. See id.; see also Homans, supra note 
51 (describing when Bosnian Serbs massacred more than seven thousand 
Muslim men and boys while Dutch U.N. peacekeepers could do nothing to 
prevent the violence). Similarly, during the 1993 Somalia dispute, peacekeep-
ing efforts were likely insufficient to have a successful outcome. See Power, 
Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 8. Also in Somalia in 2006, after an 
increase in violence, the African Union and then-U.S. President George W. 
Bush called for a United Nations peace deployment. Bellamy, The Exception 
and the Norm, supra note 22, at 6. This deployment of peacekeepers, howev-
er, has not been entirely successful. See generally Paul D. Williams, Into the 
Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia, 16 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING 514 (2009). 
 145. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 146. The ICJ supports this argument with its decision in the 2007 case of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina vs. Serbia & Montenegro. Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26) (holding that a 
state incurs responsibility “if the State manifestly failed to take all measures 
to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have con-
tributed to preventing the genocide”). One scholar has argued that this judg-
ment simply reiterates the core legal premise of R2P, which is the prevention 
and punishment of genocide, as written in the Genocide Convention. See 
Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in Internation-
al Law and Practice, 34 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 445, 450–51 (2008). 
2012] RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AFTER LIBYA 329 
applied between a nation and its citizens. Established in Part 
II above, humanitarian prevention satisfies the latter two 
prongs because of the prolific action taken in the first decade of 
this century and the underlying purpose of R2P as a nation’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens from atrocity. Thus, the 
analysis below focuses only on opinio juris and state action. 
1. Evidence of Opinio Juris: Voicing Support for Humanitarian 
Prevention 
The ICISS Report identifies a strong commitment to preven-
tion in R2P,147 evidenced in large part by its call for the inter-
national community to close the gap between rhetoric support-
ing preventive measures and actions that actually demonstrate 
a commitment to prevention.148 Moreover, after consultations 
with experts around the world, the ICISS reported that all pre-
vention techniques must be fully exhausted before implement-
ing military intervention,149 prompting some scholars to note 
that prevention is the most important aspect of R2P.150 
Though the military intervention prong of R2P gets the most 
attention and is arguably the most likely to be challenged,151 
states’ concerns about sovereignty are less acute than they once 
were.152 Indeed, according to one assessment during 2005-2009 
                                                                                                             
 147. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 3.1–3.3. 
 148. Id. ¶ 3.1; see also Charity, supra note 52, at 91 (“[P]revention is the 
most important dimension, to which far more resources must be dedicated.”). 
Charity questions whether prevention is actually the most important dimen-
sion of the doctrine, noting that approximately two-thirds of the synopsis and 
the majority of the ICISS Report is dedicated to “the most controversial” 
means of intervention. Id. 
 149. ICISS REPORT, supra note 27, ¶ 3.1. 
 150. E.g., Defeis, supra note 7, at 96. Prevention measures can take any 
form and be invoked by the individual state or the international community. 
See id.; but see Weiss, supra note 29, at 1 (“The increasing and, at times, vir-
tually exclusive emphasis on prevention in the interpretation of [the R2P] 
was politically correct but counterproductive.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 34, at 1222 (“With respect to 
military intervention—the most controversial aspect of the R2P, and the one 
creating the most obvious conflicts with state sovereignty. . . .”). 
 152. See Defeis, supra note 7, at 91–92 (“Although at one time, sovereignty 
stood as a barrier to the recognition of human rights as a matter of interna-
tional concern, today the concept of sovereignty has eroded.”); see also Louis 
Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, 
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (Oct. 1999) (explaining that since the Hol-
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of states’ support of R2P, those portions of the ICISS Report 
regarding peace and prevention are fairly uncontroversial.153 
Even during times where nations, particularly the United 
States, opposed sending their own troops to prevent mass 
atrocities, those same nations often acknowledge that certain 
peacekeeping efforts are the Security Council’s obligation to 
fulfill.154 Such was the case during the Rwandan genocide, 
when the United States used this obligation to defend the posi-
tion that the peacekeeping efforts must be tenable.155 
After Resolution 1973 was passed and NATO military forces 
went into Libya, many anticipated a backlash against R2P at 
the General Assembly debate in July 2011.156 This anticipation 
was largely unwarranted.157 Rather than encountering criti-
cism that NATO had gone too far in its military attack against 
Libya, and that Resolution 1973 itself was too much of an af-
front to traditional notions of sovereignty,158 “there was over-
whelming support for the basic concept[] and absolutely no 
move to overturn it.”159 Some countries, such as Cuba, Vene-
                                                                                                             
ocaust, how a leader treats his own people is a matter of international con-
cern, politics, and law). 
 153. Jonah Eaton, Note, Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the 
Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. INT’L L.J. 765, 799 (Summer 2011) (citing 
U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 
2009)); but see Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come . . . And Gone?, 22 INT’L REL. 283, 288–89 (2008) (citing those 
regions that after the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document showed signs 
of “buyer’s remorse” regarding the R2P: sub–Saharan Africa, the Arab–
Islamic, Latin American, and Asia). 
 154. See Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 8, at 18. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1; see also Dastoor, supra note 52, 
at 26. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Since the July 2011 United Nations discussion, there has been some 
negativity towards NATO’s execution of the Security Council’s mandate in 
Resolution 1973. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 34, at 1236. Russia, Chi-
na, and South Africa in particular, have accused NATO of overstepping its 
bounds with the intense military campaign it waged against Col. Qaddafi’s 
regime. See, e.g., Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4, at 845. 
 159. Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1; see also Eaton, supra note 153, 
at 795. Gauging attitudes towards the R2P from 2005–2009, “[i]t appears as 
if support for a detailed responsibility to protect doctrine as actually de-
creased.” However, those who were outright opposed to the doctrine, such as 
“North Korea, Iran, and Sudan are, to varying degrees, pariahs for their hu-
man rights records and belligerency.” Id. 
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zuela, and Iran, voiced objections, but even their opposition to 
R2P was less vehement than in past instances.160 More than 
anything, in fact, the discussion at the July 2011 General As-
sembly meeting showed overwhelming and enthusiastic sup-
port for preventive measures.161 As in earlier debates, though 
perhaps stronger here, states were generally comfortable with 
their responsibility to protect their own citizens and to assist in 
that protection should another leader’s own efforts willingly or 
unwillingly fail.162 Those who voiced discomfort lay their con-
cerns in the more intrusive forms of engagement, such as mili-
tary intervention.163 
In 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki–Moon released his “three 
pillars” report, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” 
which challenged the U.N. member states to further their 
commitment to R2P “from words into deeds.”164 In the General 
Assembly debate following the release of Mr. Ban’s report, 
ninety-four speakers, representing 180 member states, partici-
pated in the conversation.165 They overwhelmingly voiced their 
support for the prevention and halting of mass atrocities.166 
Most significant to the establishment of humanitarian preven-
tion as CIL, the member states unanimously conceded to the 
“importance of the first two pillars and the fundamental obliga-
tion to prevent mass atrocity crimes.”167 
                                                                                                             
 160. Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1. 
 161. See infra. 
 162. See Evans, Kamener Oration, supra note 1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Remarks on Responsible Sovereignty, supra note 7; see also Imple-
menting, supra note 87. The General Assembly formally committed itself to 
giving further consideration to the Secretary–General’s proposals; G.A. Res. 
63/308, U.N. Doc A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009). 
 165. GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, IMPLEMENTING THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE 2009 GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES: AN 
ASSESSMENT 1 (Aug. 2009). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 2. The assessment continues, 
From Algeria to Vietnam, member states agreed on the fundamental 
obligation to prevent mass atrocity crimes. As the representative of 
Nigeria emphasized, prevention rather than intervention was the 
priority. Even the few member states that struck a skeptical tone, 
such as Pakistan and Venezuela, were more welcoming on this point. 
This suggested a clear avenue for action by the member states. 
Id. at 6. 
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2. Institutional Support for Humanitarian Prevention 
Since R2P’s conception, multiple government and institution-
al mechanisms have been established to support the doc-
trine.168 One example, The Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect, was founded by international scholars and academ-
ics to transform the intellectual concept of R2P into a practical 
guide to proper state practice, and has been joined in its efforts 
by the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, 
Oxfam International, Refugees International, and WFM–
Institute for Global Policy.169 The International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect was also established by regional 
and non-governmental organizations to promote normative 
consensus around R2P.170 
At the U.N. level, two positions have been created to oversee 
the implementation of the R2P principle. Francis Deng was ap-
pointed by Secretary-General Ban Ki–Moon as Special Advisor 
on the Prevention of Genocide.171 Edward Luck was appointed 
as the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Respon-
sibility to Protect.172 The designation of these positions is par-
ticularly important to humanitarian prevention because they 
act as early warning systems to the Security Council when spe-
cific situations could result in mass atrocity.173 
3. State Practice Supporting Humanitarian Prevention 
Adopting the formula of CIL outlined in Part II, the following 
demonstrates sufficient state action in support of humanitarian 
prevention as CIL. Section a will offer evidence of state practice 
                                                                                                             
 168. See infra.; see also Bellamy, Five Years On, supra note 140, at 144 
(“Five years on from its adoption, [R2P] boasts a Global Centre and a network 
of regional affiliates dedicated to advocacy and research, an international 
coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a journal and book se-
ries, and a research fund sponsored by the Australian government.”). 
 169. Who We Are, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://globalr2p.org/whoweare/index.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
 170. Learn About the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2011). 
 171. See Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2012). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
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in the form of binding and nonbinding international agree-
ments. Section b will then provide evidence of state action un-
dertaken by the Security Council. 
 a. International Agreements 
 The 2005 World Summit Outcome, codifying U.N. mem-
ber states’ commitment to the three pillars of the R2P, provides 
the clearest demonstration of humanitarian prevention as state 
practice.174 The Security Council provided further evidence in 
this direction in 2006 when it adopted the language of the 2005 
Outcome Document in Resolution 1674.175 Then, following the 
2009 General Assembly debate regarding the Secretary-
General’s “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” re-
port,176 a General Assembly resolution codified the member 
states’ intention to give real consideration to the Secretary-
General’s recommendations about how to turn the concept of 
R2P into state practice.177 
b. Preventative Measures in Action 
U.N. peacekeeping missions over the last decade have fo-
cused primarily on the protection of civilians.178 While some 
have argued that protecting civilians is an activity distinct 
from preventing mass atrocity under R2P,179 they are in fact 
                                                                                                             
 174. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 6, ¶¶ 138–139. 
 175. S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 85. Prior to Libya, the Security Council re-
mained relatively quiet on the R2P, instead focusing on its agenda called the 
Protection of Civilians (“PoC”). See Jennifer Welsh, Civilian Protection in 
Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP, 25 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 1, 2 (2011). Welsh points out that those countries who are less supportive 
of the R2P have emphasized the more decisive threats to peace and security 
addressed by the PoC, as opposed to the broader human rights initiative 
sought by the R2P. Id. at 3. 
 176. See G.A. Res. 63/308, supra note 164. 
 177. Id. (“Recalling the 2005 World Summit Outcome, especially para-
graphs 138 and 139 thereof . . . [d]ecides to continue its consideration of the 
responsibility to protect.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 178. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4, at 828. Note that some Security 
Council members have complained that civilian protection can be a rouse for 
hidden agendas. Id. at 847; see also U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6531 st mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531 (May 10, 2011) (discussing the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict). 
 179. Jennifer Welsh addresses this issue, arguing 
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two sides of the same coin: protecting civilians cannot be seen 
as entirely distinct from preventing their deaths, even where 
both situations do not involve a leader’s having shirked his or 
her responsibility to protect the nation’s civilians. As a result, 
Security Council-imposed peacekeeping missions can be used 
as evidence of preventative action.180 Even though these actions 
were taken under Chapter VII authority, with the consent of 
the recognized government, they nonetheless dedicate a strong 
commitment to preventing harm to civilians. 
More recent focus on preventative measures is evidenced 
within the United Nations itself.181 In a recent interview, Ed-
ward Luck cited a number of examples where the U.N. imple-
mented R2P prior to Libya.182 In all of these cases, R2P consist-
                                                                                                             
It is important to underscore, however, that while the Protection of 
Civilians (“PoC”) and [the R2P] overlap, they are not the same: the 
PoC is in one sense narrower, in that it only refers to situations of 
armed conflict (and [R2P] crimes can occur outside that context); but 
it is also broader in that the rights of civilians in armed conflict ex-
tend beyond protection from mass atrocities . . . In its concentration 
on situations of armed conflict, the PoC directs the energies of the 
Council toward more clear-cut threats to peace and security, as op-
posed to the more contested area of mass human rights violations 
(the broad rubric of the [R2P]). 
Welsh, supra note 175, at 3; see also The Relationship between the Responsi-
bility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, GLOBAL 
CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (May 9, 2011), 
http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/The_Relationship_Between_POC_and_R2P-
_Updated.pdf. 
 180. See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (establishing 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (establishing the United Nations Mission in Li-
beria); S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004) (establishing the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (establishing the United Nations Stabilizing Mis-
sion in Haiti); S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004) (estab-
lishing the United Nations Operation in Burundi); S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) (establishing the United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan); S.C. Res. 1925, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010) (establishing 
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go). 
 181. Several member states noted that the Security Council’s focus is in-
creasingly dedicated to civilian protection. See generally U.N. SCOR, 65th 
Sess., 6351st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6351 (June 30, 2010). 
 182. Luck, supra note 6 (“If you look at the last several years, we’ve invoked 
the responsibility to protect . . . eight or nine times.”). 
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ed either of quiet diplomacy—diplomacy that did not require 
the use of sanctions of military force—or some kind of action 
less than military force.183 Under the lens of R2P, these U.N.-
backed actions focused on prevention.184 
For example, in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the U.N. sent educators 
to help the central government gain control over what looked 
like the potentiality for an ethnic cleansing of the Uzbek com-
munity.185 Similarly, in Guinea, the U.N. worked with regional 
and sub-regional organizations to iterate to the Guinean gov-
ernment its duties under R2P.186 And in Cote d’Ivoire, support-
ers of President Gbagbo, who lost the 2010 presidential election 
but retained control of the country’s military forces, took steps 
to indicate that genocide or ethnic cleansing may be immi-
nent.187 The U.N. took this as a serious sign of the possibility 
for ethnic cleansing or genocide.188 Though the U.N.’s early re-
action did not prevent the thousands of deaths that unfolded 
before Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011,189 Luck points out, 
“[y]ou never know what the hypothetical might have been: 
what would have happened if you didn’t do anything?”190 This 
statement highlights the emphasis the U.N. now places on pre-
vention. In an ideal world, the U.N. would never need to con-
sider how to respond with military force after considerable 
death, but rather, only how to successfully prevent those 
deaths before they occur.191 
Although the process to build the needed capacity to priori-
tize prevention of mass atrocities has been slow, Secretary-
                                                                                                             
 183. Id. 
 184. See infra. 
 185. See Luck, supra note 6; see also Maxton Walker, Kyrgyzstan: The Scars 
of Ethnic Conflict Run Deep, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2011, 12:53 EDT), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/kyrgyzstan-ethnic-conflict-osh-
uzbekistan. 
 186. Luck, supra note 6. 
 187. Id.; see also Côte d’Ivoire: U.N. Reinforces Peacekeepers as Officials 
Warn of Risks of Genocide, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37311&Cr=ivoire&Cr1. 
 188. Luck, supra note 6. 
 189. U.N. Rights Expert Arrives in Ivory Coast, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Nov. 
14, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/11/14/U.N.-
rights-expert-arrives-in-Ivory-Coast/UPI-25071321291461/. Prior to his ar-
rest, fourteen rounds of negotiation were insufficient to quell the violence. 
Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4, at 834. 
 190. Luck, supra note 6. 
 191. See id. 
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General Ban Ki–Moon has persistently emphasized its essenti-
ality.192 In the Libyan example,193 after it became clear of Col. 
Qaddafi’s intention to mutilate protestors, U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, issued a statement on 
February 22, 2011, that “[p]rotection of civilians should always 
be the paramount consideration in maintaining order and the 
rule of law. [Libyan] authorities should immediately cease such 
illegal acts of violence against demonstrators. Widespread and 
systematic attacks against the civilian population may amount 
to crimes against humanity.”194 Also on February 22, Deng and 
Luck issued a statement reminding Col. Qaddafi of his 2005 
pledge to adhere to the principles of R2P.195 On February 23, 
the Secretary-General echoed the call for Libya to take respon-
sibility for the safety of its citizens,196 thus setting the stage for 
Resolution 1970, “which condemned attacks on the [Libyan] 
civilian population that it deemed could amount to crimes 
against humanity. . . .”197 Despite its robust command, the pre-
ventive measures outlined in Resolution 1970 were “relatively 
uncontroversial.”198 
                                                                                                             
 192. Bellamy, The Exception and the Norm, supra note 22, at 2. But see 
Welsh, supra note 175, at 6–7 (arguing the need to elaborate on the coercive 
tools available to the international community either to prevent, or react to, 
mass atrocity). As Welsh points out, “the Libyan case suggests that preven-
tive action does not end with the onset of pillar three. Indeed, the majority of 
the policy tools and measures considered and implemented through Resolu-
tion 1970 fall within what Ban Ki–Moon calls ‘timely and decisive response.’” 
Id. at 7. 
 193. For a detailed account of the events leading up to Resolutions 1970 and 
1973, see Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4. 
 194. Pillay calls for international inquiry into Libyan violence and justice 
for victims, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=107
43&LangID=E. 
 195. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Preven-
tion of Genocide Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml. 
 196. Bellamy, The Exception and the Norm, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 197. Id at 3. The measures in Resolution 1970, which included an arms em-
bargo, assets freeze, travel bans, and referral of  the case to the International 
Criminal Court, were robust for Security Council standards. Weiss, supra 
note 29, at 289. 
 198. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 4, at 840. See also U.N. Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
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When Resolution 1970 did not succeed in halting the vio-
lence, the Secretary-General took it upon himself to phone Col. 
Qaddafi in an attempt to persuade him to comply with Resolu-
tion 1970.199 Only when these preventive measures failed did 
the Security Council resort to military force under Resolution 
1973, paving the way for the NATO intervention. 
B. R2P and Libya: A Special Case? 
Prior to the Libyan intervention, much of the literature on 
R2P encouraged development of the doctrine by focusing on 
conceptualizing and institutionalizing the norm.200 The most 
pivotal moment for such forward movement of R2P, and indeed 
its most obvious invocation, was in Security Council Resolution 
1973, which authorized use of all necessary force to protect 
Libyan civilians from Col. Qaddafi’s military attacks.201 The 
obvious question follows: if military action was invoked under a 
R2P framework in Libya but is not in other similarly volatile 
and deadly conflicts, is R2P effective and, in turn, worth pro-
moting? This section discusses why Libya may have been a 
special case and thus an outlier in the R2P discussion. 
Four important points provide context for an honest reflec-
tion about the intervention in Libya and its effects on the fu-
ture of R2P. First, Libya was exceptional because of the vi-
ciousness with which Col. Qaddafi attacked the protesting Lib-
yan citizens.202 In particular, Col. Qaddafi identified his targets 
as “cockroaches,” the exact term used by the Hutu in Rwanda 
to identify the Tutsi who were slaughtered.203 He later identi-
fied the protesters as “rats” and “vermin” who must be “elimi-
nated” such that their “blood flow[ed] from the streets.”204 
These words were indications to the U.N. that the probability 
of mass atrocity was imminent and high.205 
Second, prior to Security Council action, regional multi-state 
organizations, which are normally most concerned with pro-
tecting the sovereignty of their members, called for an inter-
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vention.206 The Arab League, the African Union, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council all advocated for a no-fly zone before the 
Security Council responded to Col. Qaddafi’s behavior.207 Their 
strong public stance made clear that Col. Qaddafi “had few 
friends in the region”208 and ultimately pressured China and 
Russia to abstain from vetoing Resolution 1973.209 
Third, the time frame for the crisis to unfold was extremely 
short.210 Conflict was not widely anticipated, evidenced by the 
fact that none of the world’s risk-assessment organizations 
considered Libya as a possible place of mass atrocity before the 
uprising began.211 For example, the International Crisis Group 
did not issue a risk alert until after the conflict began.212 The 
speed with which Qaddafi began killing civilians did not leave 
time for the Security Council to implement some of the more 
gradual precautions, such as mediation, before it issued Reso-
lution 1970.213 Resolution 1973, which came shortly thereafter, 
preempted the fall of Benghazi by days, at most.214 Had Qadda-
fi’s actions been less swift, it is possible that the preventative 
measures included in Resolution 1970, such as tough economic 
sanctions, an arms embargo, freezing Col. Qaddafi’s assets, and 
referring the case to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), 
would have been enough. 
And finally, any real analysis of whether the Libyan inter-
vention was a success is, only a year later, at least incomplete 
if not premature.215 Though Col. Qaddafi is dead, leaving room 
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for an entirely new Libyan government to form,216 only time 
will tell whether this intervention made way for a positive fu-
ture for Libya and the Middle East, particularly Syria.217 If 
                                                                                                             
 216. See Shadi Hamid, The First True Arab Intervention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2011, 4:56 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/22/lessons-
of-the-libyan-endgame/the-first-true-arab-revolution; 
Democracy is about much more than removal of dictators and elec-
tions. The rule of law, due process, human rights and the vital need 
for a democratic culture is yet to emerge in the region. In the ab-
sence of the manifestation of these principles, we are seeing Chris-
tians being killed in Egypt, cinemas being burnt in Tunisia, and de-
mands for hard-line interpretations of sharia as state law being 
made by Salafist groups. 
Ed Husain, The Real Risks of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/20/qaddafis-end-the-
mideasts-future/the-real-risks-of-chaos. 
 217. One of the biggest challenges facing the R2P, at least in terms of the 
perception that it is an established international norm, is how R2P can lead 
to military intervention in Libya, but not Syria, where, as of this writing, an 
estimated 20,000 civilians have been killed since protests broke out in March 
of 2011. See Steven Lee Myers & Jane Perlez, No Movement on Major Dis-
putes as Clinton Meets with Chinese Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, A10, Sept. 5, 2012. 
An additional 240,000 Syrian refugees have fled the country. Id.; see also Pat-
tison, supra note 72, at 276 (“The intervention in Libya is morally problemat-
ic because the NATO-led coalition has failed to act in response to similar sit-
uations in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen.”). Shadi Hamid, the director of re-
search at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, says that without military 
intervention, the “Libyans would not be enjoying their newfound freedom.” 
Shadi Hamid, Will Syrians Seek Outside Help?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011, 
4:40 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/20/qaddafis-end-
the-mideasts-future/libyas-lessons-for-syria. But, Hamid also comments that 
the Libyan model is only useful to the extent that it can be replicated. See id. 
In the months following the outbreak of violence, Syrians began to call for 
more help in the form of no-fly zones, ground troops and arms transfers. See 
id.; see also Syria Unrest: Arab League Denounces Civilian Killings, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2011, 4:24 ET) [hereinafter Syria Unrest], 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15503350. But see Jonathon 
Marcus, Why China and Russia Rebuffed the West on Syria, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
5, 2011; 7:35 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15180732 
(discussing the meaning of China’s and Russia’s vetoes of a Security Council 
resolution condemning the crackdown by President al-Assad in Syria). As in 
Libya, the Arab League has put significant pressure on the Assad regime to 
“take the necessary measures” to protect Syrian civilians. See Syria Unrest. 
However, to date the Security Council has not taken steps to quell the vio-
lence in Syria that are nearly as aggressive as was Resolution 1973. 
340 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
general consensus among the international community regards 
Libya as unsuccessful, this will pave the way for critics of R2P 
to reiterate their doubts about the doctrine’s legitimacy.218 
C. Looking Forward: Syria and Beyond 
Alex Bellamy argues that “[d]ebates about preventing and re-
sponding to mass atrocities are no longer primarily about 
whether to act, but about how to act.”219 The Libyan case pro-
vides an example that early assessment and pooling capacities 
can play a positive role in planning and executing prevention 
strategies.220 But more than this, it demonstrates the degree to 
which humanitarian prevention is CIL. The question was not 
whether to stop Col. Qaddafi from taking over Benghazi, but 
how best to stop him.221 
In 2011 and 2012, Syria has been frequently cited as evidence 
that R2P is merely wishful thinking on the part of military in-
terventionists and that Libya is an outlier.222 However, the ex-
tent to which this is true can only be in regards to military in-
tervention, not prevention tactics. The United States, Europe-
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an Union, and Arab League all imposed tough economic sanc-
tions on Syria in the late fall of 2011.223 On November 22, 2011, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Syr-
ian government under President Bashar al-Assad for not up-
holding its responsibility to protect Syrian civilians.224 Seven 
months later on June 30, 2012, the United Nations-backed Ac-
tion Group on Syria (“AGS”), agreed on a six-step plan for a 
transition to peace to be implemented by former Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, as well as criticized the continuing vio-
lence.225 As of this writing, the U.N. Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs was ramping up its ground presence 
in Syria, providing aid to the more than 200,000 internally dis-
placed persons.226 In addition, U.N. Security Council resolution 
2043227 sent the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria 
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to monitor violence and provide support for the six-point plan 
adopted by the AGS.228 
Regretfully, the Action Group’s Joint Envoy resigned from its 
mission, in part due to disagreements among the five perma-
nent Security Council members on the best approach to the 
worsening situation.229 Yet, the actions above still suggest that 
the international community recognizes its legal obligation to 
halt mass atrocity, which is heavily embedded in the R2P doc-
trine. The fact that military intervention has not yet been im-
posed in Syria does not necessarily indicate an R2P failure.230 
Rather, if prevention techniques can prove successful, it is a 
signal of two important points: first, that Edward Luck’s wish 
that the U.N. be able to stop pushing the doctrine is coming 
true. Second, it is evidence that the international community 
recognizes its obligation under CIL to prevent humanitarian 
atrocity. 
CONCLUSION 
R2P codified a nation’s responsibility to protect its citizens 
from mass atrocities and the international community’s role in 
assisting in that endeavor. In doing so, R2P paved the way for 
the emergence of a new international norm, one that mandates 
the prevention of human destruction. Humanitarian preven-
tion—under an approach to CIL that minimizes state practice, 
allows CIL to develop quickly, and states that CIL governs the 
conduct between a nation and its citizens—is a binding law on 
nations. But such a designation is not in itself a solution to 
human destruction; nations and international institutions 
must be steadfast in adhering to its call. This will require per-
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sistence, patience, and creativity in approach, to ensure that 
citizens are not innocent casualties of their state’s misconduct. 
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